NASA Procedural Requirements

NPR 1620.2A
Effective Date: October 07, 2015
Expiration Date: October 07, 2020

COMPLIANCE IS MANDATORY

Facility Security Assessments

Responsible Office: Office of Protective Services

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Preface

P.1 Purpose

a. This NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) establishes NASA requirements for determining a Center/facility security level for NASA facilities, except Classified National Security Information (CNSI) and nuclear and chemical materials.

b. This security assessment procedure supports NASA's Center management in meeting the responsibility of protecting NASA's assets in a cost-effective manner. It is designed to assist security officers who support management and the NASA Security Program. The results of the physical security assessments are used to determine the appropriate level of protection needed to safeguard NASA's Center's/facilities adequately and economically.

c. The level of security adopted is based upon applicable physical security measures and security procedures contained in NPR 1600.1 and 1620.3. The methodology used in this document meets the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) Standards as outlined in "The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities: an Interagency Security Committee Standard" published by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The results of the physical security vulnerability risk assessment are to be used to satisfy the requirements of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-7. The results of this assessment should also determine the corresponding criteria written in NPR 1620.3.

d. When completed, the results of the security assessment and mitigation plans is labeled and handled as Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) in accordance with current policy and procedure (NID 1600.55).

> *[Note: Marking requirements for NASA sensitive unclassified information will be changed in FY 2016 (approximately) as Executive Order 13556 is executed and the current SBU program is replaced by the federally mandated Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) program.] Until the CUI program is fully implemented, use of the CUI designation is not authorized. At the time of this version of NPR 1620.2, the policy for CUI has not been received from higher authority and is not implemented.*

e. The overall purpose of this NPR and its sister document, NPR 1620.3, is to establish a baseline physical security posture for each assessed facility based on its mission criticality, symbolism, facility population, facility size, and undesirable event. Thereafter, subsequent changes in threat indicators could require the Center Security Chief to implement temporary security measures designed to mitigate threats based on current intelligence.

f. This assessment tool is a living document and will occasionally be updated to ensure its continued application and viability, based on direction from the DHS.

P.2 Applicability

a. This directive is applicable to NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers, including Component Facilities and Technical and Service Support Centers. This directive applies to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, other contractors, grant recipients, or parties to agreements only to the extent specified or referenced in the appropriate contracts.

b. "Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities - An Interagency Security Committee Standard" (the Standard) defines the criteria and process to be used in determining the

facility security level (FSL) of a Federal facility, a categorization which then serves as the basis for implementing protective measures under other ISC standards. Consistent with the authority contained in Executive Order (EO) 12977, dated October 19, 1995, the Standard is applicable to all buildings and facilities in the United States occupied by Federal employees for non-military activities. These include existing buildings, new construction, or major modernizations; facilities owned, to be purchased, or leased; stand-alone facilities, Federal campuses, and, where appropriate, individual facilities on Federal campuses; and special-use facilities.

c. This NPR is applicable to all NASA leased and owned facilities excluding CNSI, nuclear, and chemical storage facilities mentioned in Section P1 of this NPR.

d. Address comments regarding this NPR to the:

Office of Protective Services
NASA Headquarters
300 E ST SW
Washington, DC 20546.

e. Refer questions concerning the application of these standards at NASA Centers to the appropriate NASA Center Security Office.

P.3 Authority

a. National Space Program, 42 U.S.C. § 2473(c) (1).

b. Interagency Security Committee, E.O. 12977.

c. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 14 CFR pt. 1203a.

d. NPD 1600.2, NASA Security Policy.

P.4 Applicable Documents and Forms

a. Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, PPD-21.

b. Implement Controlled Unclassified Information, E.O. 13556.

c. DHS-ISC, The Risk Management Process: An Interagency Security Committee Standard

d. DHS-ISC, The Design-Basis Threat

e. HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection.

f. NPR 1600.1, NASA Security Program Procedural Requirements.

g. NPR 1620.3, Physical Security Requirements for NASA Facilities and Property.

h. NID 1600.55, Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) Information.

i. NHQ Form 1805, Facility Security Level Determination Matrix

P.5 Measurement / Verification

Verification of this NPR will be documented on NASA Form 1805, Facility Security Level Determination Matrix. All authorized signatures on the NF 1805 will be completed and the form

maintained by the Center Office of Protective Services. Upon request of the Headquarters Office of Protective Services, copies of Form 1805 will be electronically sent.

P.7 Cancellation

None

/S/
Woodrow Whitlow, Jr.
Associate Administrator
Mission Support Directorate

Chapter 1: Determining the Center/Facility Security Level

1.1 General

1.1.1. The initial FSL determination for new leased or owned space will be made as soon as practical after the identification of a space requirement (including succeeding leases). The determination should be made early enough in the space acquisition process to allow for the implementation of required countermeasures (or reconsideration of the acquisition caused by an inability to meet minimum physical security requirements.)

1.1.2 Upon the effective date of this NPR, all NASA facilities/buildings will be initially assessed using this methodology. Once the initial assessments are completed, risk assessments will be conducted at least every five years for level one and level two facilities and every three years for levels three and four facilities from the facility's previous assessment date. There will be an FSL designated for the Center overall, and each facility within the Center will have its own FSL designation. Center Chiefs of Protective Services, at their discretion, may decline to conduct assessments of buildings determined not to have any Center operational or mission support value (e.g., abandoned or decommissioned facilities, vacant sheds, and vacant trailers.) 1.1.3 Implementation of countermeasures inclusive of policies and procedures will be based on risk with the appropriate FSL level. The FSL will be reviewed and adjusted, if necessary, as part of each initial and recurring risk assessment. The responsibility for making the final FSL determination rests with the Center Director as the Designated Official (DO), who must either accept the risk or fund security measures to reduce the risk. Artificially lowering the FSL level to avoid countermeasure implementation is not permitted.

a. For single-tenant Government-owned or leased facilities, a representative of the Center's Office of Protective Services will make the FSL determination, in consultation with the Center Director responsible for the facility. For single tenant facilities owned or leased through General Services Administration (GSA), the FSL determination will be made by the Federal Protective Services in coordination with the Center Office of Protective Services and in consultation with the Center Director.

b. In multitenant Government-owned or leased facilities, the DO in coordination with a representative of each Federal tenant i.e., the Facility Security committee will make the FSL determination in consultation with the owning/leasing department or agency and the security organization(s) responsible for the facility.

c. A campus or NASA Center consists of two or more Federal facilities located contiguous to one another and sharing some aspects of the environment (e.g., parking, courtyards, vehicle access roads, or gates) or security features (e.g., a perimeter fence, guard force, or onsite central alarm/closed circuit television monitoring station). In multitenant Centers, all individual facilities in the campus will be assigned an FSL in accordance with this NPR. d. While the incorporation of additional factors and criteria makes this NPR more useful to determine the FSL for special-use and other unique facilities, such as high-security laboratories, hospitals, or unique storage facilities for chemicals or munitions, some facilities may still not fit neatly into the criteria defined here. The criticality of the mission or the symbolic nature of the facility could be such that it merits a degree of protection above that specified for a FSL Level IV facility, even though the other contributing factors, such as population or square footage may be scored lower.

(1) For example, a research laboratory might receive lower score values for symbolism, square footage, and population size. However, the laboratory may be responsible for critical research and diagnostic activities that are vital to protecting NASA research and intellectual property that if compromised could pose a threat to the United States National Security. This mission, combined with the fact that it may be the only such laboratory in the country, would suggest that the criticality factor would far outweigh lower score values in symbolism, population, and/or facility size, and thus the facility should be considered for a Level V designation. As a result, the criteria and decision-making authority for identifying Level V facilities are within the purview of the individual Center. As general guidance, Centers should consider a facility as potentially suitable for a Level V designation if it receives a "very high" score value for criticality or symbolism and is a one-of-a-kind facility (or nearly so).

1.2 Purpose of a Center/Facility Security Level Determination

1.2.1. Not all NASA assets at all Centers and locations require the same degree of protection.

1.2.2. Protection of assets must be based on a realistic assessment of the risk associated with the types of threats likely to be directed at the assets in their actual locations, the vulnerability of the asset, the asset value, and response capabilities of law enforcement and/or security forces.

1.2.3. Performing the Center/FSL assessment allows NASA managers to establish asset protection programs appropriate for their value and the likelihood of an attempt to compromise them.

1.2.4. The Center/FSL Determination allows Center management to prioritize assets so that physical security resources can be applied in the most efficient and cost-effective manner possible.

1.3 Risk

For the purposes of this NPR, risk is the identification of credible threats, vulnerabilities, and measuring the probability of the consequences using counter-measures to mitigate the threats and vulnerabilities, and/or accepting the risk as they are associated with NASA assets.

1.4. Undesirable Events

The undesirable events to NASA facilities from criminal elements must also be evaluated in determining the FSL. Consideration must be given to the risk from more common criminal acts, such as theft, assault, unlawful demonstrations, workplace violence, and vandalism acts which historically occur more frequently at Federal facilities than acts of terrorism. Although terrorism is of concern based on past events, it should not be the default threat unless there is credible threat intelligence directly related to NASA assets. Possible sources of references could be local Center incident reports; local police reports; NASA OPS counterintelligence; and other Federal, state, and local law enforcement credible information.

1.5 Vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities for purposes of this NPR are identified as the unmitigated threats and/or mitigated threats of a NASA asset that can be compromised. Although the vulnerability may be already mitigated, outdated technologies or more sophisticated threats may create the vulnerability.

1.6 Consequences

After identifying the threats and vulnerabilities of NASA assets, a consequence will be identified as a result of the attack. Based on the severity of the attack and the criticality of the asset, the consequence will need to be mitigated. Although the consequence could be severe, the likelihood of a threat event taking place could be low. This should not be reason to eliminate or not address the consequences of the threat and vulnerabilities. It should be a consideration of the mitigation strategy implemented.

1.7 Assets

NASA assets are people, property, and information. Much of the direction of the NASA Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (NCIPP) is directed at protecting NASA critical infrastructure assets. Typically, it is the potential publicity that would come with bombing a NASA facility or destroying and compromising a critical or symbolic NASA resource that an aggressor would find desirable. The NASA Security program is based upon protecting the greater installation, its critical facilities, and other critical assets, which will in turn provide greater protection for NASA assets.

Chapter 3: Level V Facilities

3.1.1 While the incorporation of additional factors and criteria makes this NPR more useful to determine the FSL for special-use and other unique facilities, such as high-security laboratories, hospitals, or unique storage facilities for chemicals or munitions, some facilities may still not fit neatly into the criteria defined here. The criticality of the mission or the symbolic nature of the facility could be such that it merits a degree of protection above that specified for a FSL Level IV facility, even though the other contributing factors, such as population or square footage, might be scored lower.

3.1.2 For example, a research laboratory might receive lower score values for symbolism, square footage, and population size. However, the laboratory may be responsible for critical research and diagnostic activities that are vital to protecting the Nation's citizenry or animal and food products from disease agents accidentally or deliberately introduced into the United States. This mission, combined with the fact that it may be the only such laboratory in the country, would suggest that the criticality factor would far outweigh lower score values in symbolism, population, and/or facility size, and thus the facility should be considered for a Level V designation. As a result, the criteria and decision-making authority for identifying Level V facilities are within the purview of the individual center. As general guidance, Centers should consider a facility as potentially suitable for a Level V designation if it receives a "very high" score value for criticality or symbolism and is a one-of-a-kind facility (or nearly so).

Chapter 4: Transition to NPR 1620.3

4.1.1 Once the FSL determination has been established, the security specialist will move to NPR 1620.3 to implement the countermeasures that are associated with the FSL level. The corresponding FSL number is found at the top of the columns of Chapter 7 in NPR 1620.3. Based on risk to the asset, an appropriate level of protection will be implemented.

Appendix A: Definitions

Campus: Two or more Federal facilities located contiguous to one another and typically sharing some aspects of the environment, such as parking, courtyards, private vehicle access roads, or gates and entrances to connected facilities. A campus may also be referred to as a "Federal Center" or "complex."

Continuity of Government: (COG) is the principle of establishing defined procedures that allow a government to continue its essential operations in case of nuclear war or other catastrophic event.

Continuity of Operations: (COOP) is a Federal initiative, required by Presidential directive, to ensure that agencies are able to continue performance of essential functions under a broad range of circumstances.

Controlled Unclassified Information: (CUI) is information. The CUI Program is being implemented across the Executive Branches of the Government in approximately FY 2016 as mandated by Executive Order 13556, Implement Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) signed by the President in November 4, 2010. The CUI Program will completely replace the current designation methodology at NASA under Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) Information.

Designated Official: The highest ranking official of the primary tenant agency of a Federal facility or, alternatively, a designee selected by mutual agreement of tenant agency officials. For facilities owned and leased by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), the definition appears in Title 41, Section 102-71.20, of the Code of Federal Regulations (41 C.F.R. 102-71.20). For the purposes of NASA, the Center Director will be the Designated Official.

Essential Functions: Government functions that enable Federal Executive Branch agencies to provide vital services, exercise civil authority, maintain the safety and well-being of the general populace, and sustain the industrial/economic base in an emergency.

Facility Security Level: A categorization based on the analysis of several security-related facility factors, which then serves as the basis for the implementation of certain protective security measures specified in other ISC standards.

Federal Departments and Agencies: Those Executive Departments enumerated in 5 U.S.C. §101, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS); independent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. §104(1); Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. §103(1); and the United States Postal Service.

Federal Facilities: Leased and owned buildings and facilities in the United States (inclusive of its territories) occupied by Federal Executive Branch employees for nonmilitary activities.

Mixed Tenant Facility: A facility that includes one Federal tenant as well as non-Federal tenants, including commercial and state/local government tenants.

Multitenant Facility: A facility that includes tenants from multiple Federal departments and agencies but no non-Federal tenants.

National Essential Functions (NEFs): That subset of essential functions that are necessary to lead and sustain the Nation during a catastrophic emergency and that, therefore, must be supported through the COOP and COG capabilities.

Primary Mission Essential Functions: Those essential functions that must be performed to support

or implement the performance of NEFs before, during, and in the aftermath of an emergency.

Security Organization: The Government agency or an internal agency component responsible for physical security at the specific facility (e.g., the DHS Federal Protective Service and NASA Office of Protective Services).

Single Tenant Facility: A facility that only includes one Federal tenant or multiple components of the same Federal department or agency that fall under one "umbrella" for security purposes.

Special-Use Facilities: An entire facility or space within a facility that contains environments, equipment, or data normally not housed in typical office, storage, or public access facilities. Examples of special-use facilities include, but are not limited to, high-security laboratories, hospitals, aircraft and spacecraft hangers, or unique storage facilities designed specifically for such things as chemicals and explosives.